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Visual cognition, high-level vision, mid-level vision and top-down processing all refer to decision-based
scene analyses that combine prior knowledge with retinal input to generate representations. The label
‘‘visual cognition’’ is little used at present, but research and experiments on mid- and high-level,
inference-based vision have ﬂourished, becoming in the 21st century a signiﬁcant, if often understated
part, of current vision research. How does visual cognition work? What are its moving parts? This paper
reviews the origins and architecture of visual cognition and brieﬂy describes some work in the areas of
routines, attention, surfaces, objects, and events (motion, causality, and agency). Most vision scientists
avoid being too explicit when presenting concepts about visual cognition, having learned that explicit
models invite easy criticism. What we see in the literature is ample evidence for visual cognition, but
few or only cautious attempts to detail how it might work. This is the great unﬁnished business of vision
research: at some point we will be done with characterizing how the visual system measures the world
and we will have to return to the question of how vision constructs models of objects, surfaces, scenes,
and events.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
A critical component of vision is the creation of visual entities,
representations of surfaces and objects that do not change the base
data of the visual scene but change which parts we see as belong-
ing together and how they are arrayed in depth. Whether seeing a
set of dots as a familiar letter, an arrangement of stars as a con-
nected shape or the space within a contour as a ﬁlled volume that
may or may not connect with the outside space, the entity that is
constructed is uniﬁed in our mind even if not in the image. The
construction of these entities is the task of visual cognition and,
in almost all cases, each construct is a choice among an inﬁnity
of possibilities, chosen based on likelihood, bias, or a whim, but
chosen by rejecting other valid competitors. The entities are not
limited to static surfaces or structures but also include dynamic
structures that only emerge over time – from dots that appear to
be walking like a human or a moon orbiting a planet, to the causal-
ity and intention seen in the interaction of dots, and the syntax and
semantics of entire events. There is clearly some large-scale infor-
mation processing system that accumulates and oversees these vi-
sual computations. We will look at various mid-level visual
domains (for example, depth and light) and dynamic domains (mo-
tion, intentionality and causality) and brieﬂy survey general mod-
els of visual cognition. I will cover both mid- and high-level
processing as equally interesting components of visual cognition:ll rights reserved.
ras rough categories, mid-level vision calls on local inferential pro-
cesses dealing with surfaces whereas high-level vision operates on
objects and scenes. Papers on high-level vision have been rare in
this journal but papers on mid-level and dynamic aspects of vision
are not and there are three other reviews touching on these area in
this special issue (Kingdom, 2011; Morgan, 2011; Thompson &
Burr, 2011). We start here by placing the mid- and high-level vi-
sion system within the overall processing architecture of the brain.
The descriptions of surfaces, objects, and events computed by
mid- and high-level processes are not solely for consumption in
the visual system but live at a level that is appropriate for passing
onto other brain centers. Clearly, the description of visual scene
cannot be sent in its entirety, like a picture or movie, to other cen-
ters as that would require that each of them have their own visual
system to decode the description. Some very compressed, anno-
tated, or labeled version must be constructed that can be passed
on in a format and that other centers – memory, language, plan-
ning – can understand. This idea of a common space and a common
format for exchange between brain centers (see Fig. 1) has been
proposed by Baars (1988) and Dehaene and Naccache (2001) and
others as a central bulletin board or chat room where the different
centers post current descriptions and receive requests from each
other like perhaps ‘‘Vision: Are there any red things just above
the upcoming road intersection?’’ The nature of this high-level, vi-
sual description that can be exported to and understood by other
centers is as yet, completely unknown. We can imagine that it
might embody the content that we label as conscious vision if only
Fig. 1. Central billboard. Different modules post information on the billboard (or
blackboard) and these become accessible to all. Vision would post high-level
descriptions of visual events in a format that other brain modules understand
(Baars, 1988, 2002; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; van der Velde & de Kamps, 2006).
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areas of the brain so visual representations that become conscious
are probably those shared outside strictly visual centers. The com-
ponents of high-level visual representation may therefore be those
that we can report as conscious visual percepts. That is not saying
much, but at least, if this is the case, high-level vision would not be
trafﬁcking in some obscure hidden code and eventually we may be
able to extract the grammar, the syntax and semantics of conscious
vision, and so of high-level visual representation.
Saying that the components of high-level vision are the con-
tents of our visual awareness does not mean that these mental
states are computed consciously. It only means that the end point,
the product of a whole lot of pre-conscious visual computation is
an awareness of the object or intention or connectedness. In fact,
what interests us here is speciﬁcally the unconscious computation
underlying these products, and not the further goal-related activi-
ties that are based on them. A long, visually guided process like
baking a cake or driving a car has many intermediate steps that
make a sequence of conscious states heading toward some ﬁnal
goal but that higher-level production system (c.f., Anderson, Fin-
cham, Qin, & Stocco, 2008; Anderson et al., 2004; Newell, 1990)
is not visual in nature. We are interested in the rapid, unconscious
visual processes that choose among many possible representations
to come up the one that we experience as a conscious percept.
Attention and awareness may limit how much unconscious infer-
ence we can manage and what it will be focused on but it is the
unconscious decision processes that are the wheelhouse of visual
cognition.
We can divide vision into two parts: measurement and infer-
ence (Marr, 1982). In the measurement part, neurons with recep-
tive ﬁelds with enormous variation in specialization report
spatially localized signal strengths for their particular parameter
of interest. These receptive ﬁelds span signal classes from bright-
ness all the way to face identity (Tsao & Livingstone, 2008; Turk
& Pentland, 1991; see Ungerleider, 2011). They are reﬂexive, hard-
wired, acquired with experience, modulated by context and atten-
tion, but they give, at best, only hints at what might be out there.
Research on the receptive ﬁelds forms the solid foundation of vi-
sion research. To date, the most inﬂuential discoveries in vision
and the major part of current work can be described as character-
izing this measurement component of vision. It is accessible with
single cell recordings, animal research, and human behavior. It is
understandable that this accessibility has led to impressive discov-
eries and successful research programs.
However, this is only the ﬁrst step in seeing as the visual system
must infer (see Figs. 2, 3) from these measurements a ﬁnal percept
that we experience. We do not get a sense of the world that is raw
and sketchy measurement but a solid visual experience with little
or no evidence of the inferences that lie behind it. Note that an
inference is not a guess. It is a rule-based extension from partialdata to the most appropriate solution. It is constraint satisfaction
like real-world Sudoku or playing 20 questions with nature (Koss-
lyn, 2006; Newell, 1973). Guessing, even optimal guessing as spec-
iﬁed by Bayes, is not a mechanism but only sets limits for any
mechanistic approach. It is covered in a separate paper of this issue
(Geisler, 2011). Deconstructing the mechanisms of inference is dif-
ﬁcult and not yet very rewarding. There are too many plausible
alternatives and too many ﬂinty-eyed reviewers who can see the
obvious shortcomings. So one goal of this review is to underline
the difﬁculty of research in high-level vision as well as its impor-
tance. It did have a run of intense activity in the 1970s and
1980s during the days of classical, big picture, biological and com-
puter vision. This synergy between physiology, biological and com-
putation research peaked with the publication of David Marr’s
book in 1982 and Irv Biederman’s Recognition-by-Components pa-
per in 1987. Since then, there have been a few hardy and adven-
turesome contributors, whose work I will feature where possible.
However, it became clear that many models were premature and
underconstrained by data. Rather than risk the gauntlet of justiﬁ-
able skepticism, most vision research turned to the more solid
ground of how vision measures the world, putting off to the future
the harder question of how it draws inferences.
In looking at the history of the inference mechanisms behind vi-
sual cognition, this paper will touch as well on conscious executive
functions, like attention, that swap in or out different classes of
measurements, and the memory structures that provide the world
knowledge and heuristics that make the inferences effective. How-
ever, other sections of this issue cover these components in more
detail (Carrasco, 2011). We will start by looking at the inferences
themselves, beginning with the history of visual cognition and
unconscious inference, an evaluation of the computational power
of visual inference, a survey of the important contributions of the
past 25 years and the basic components they lay out. We will
end with a consideration of large-scale models of visual cognition
and how it ﬁts in with the overall architecture of the brain.
We give our respects to Helmholtz as a dazzling polymath of the
late 1800s, a pioneer who along with Faraday, Cantor and others
made staggering contributions. It was Helmholtz who gave us
the concept of unconscious inference. Well, just a minute, actually
it was not. In truth, he lifted it, as well as the anecdotes used to jus-
tify it, from ibn al-Haytham (1024, translation, Sabra, 1989; review
Howard, 1996). Known as Alhazen in the west, ibn al-Haythamwas
the Helmholtz of his time, a well-known mathematician and pio-
neer contributor to optics (discovered the lens, the pinhole camera,
and the scientiﬁc method) and mathematics. His books from the
11th century were translated into Latin and, until Kepler, they
were the fundamental texts in Europe for optics. At least his ﬁrst
book of optics was. The second and third books where he outlined
his theory of unconscious inference, the visual sentient, were much
less well known. However, they were undoubtedly read by Helm-
holtz (who did cite Alhazen but only for the work of his ﬁrst book)
as he repeats Alhazen’s concepts almost word for word. So to give
credit where it is due, Alhazen is truly the father of visual cognition
which will therefore in 2024 celebrate its 1000th anniversary.
Since this review covers only the last 25 years of visual cognition
and the 11th century falls a bit earlier, I will not say much about
Alhazen other than to note that he had already outlined many of
the ideas that fuel current research. As Jerry Fodor (2001) once
said, ‘‘that’s what so nice about cognitive science, you can drop
out for a couple of centuries and not miss a thing. (p. 49)’’ Well,
the basic ideas may not have changed much but the speciﬁcs are
a lot clearer and the methods more sophisticated. That is what will
be covered here.
Before reviewing the research itself, one question stands out
that we should consider: cognition, does not the brain already do
that? Elsewhere? How can there be a separate visual cognition?
Fig. 2. Inference. In both these examples, the visual system assumes parameters for body shape and axes and ﬁts these to the image measurements. Some of these
assumptions are overly constraining and so occasionally wrong. The resulting errors demonstrate the inference underlying our perception. On the left, the gray goose is ﬂying
upside down, a maneuver known as whifﬂing. The front/back body orientation for the goose that we reﬂexively infer from the head orientation conﬂicts with actual body axis.
On the right, the man is wearing shoes on his hands. We infer that the limbs wearing shoes are legs. We infer incorrectly. Errors such as these are evidence of inference and a
window into the inference process.
Fig. 3. Ambiguous ﬁgure (from Rock, 1984). These amorphous shapes in white on
black have very little information and yet they connect to object knowledge about
human form. This recovers the possible shape of a woman sitting on a bench. No
bottom up analysis can recover either of these elements. No image analysis based
on parts or surfaces can work as shadow regions have broken the real object parts
into accidental islands of black or white.
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dent existence with extraordinarily sophisticated inferences that
are totally separate from standard, everyday, reportable cognition.
Knowing, for example, that the two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion
are identical in length does not make them look so. Pylyshyn calls
this cognitive impenetrability but we might see it as cognitive
independence: having an independent, intelligent agent – vision
– with its own inference mechanisms. Given that the brain devotes
30–40% of its prime cortical real estate to vision we can certainly
imagine that the ‘‘visual brain’’ is a smart one, even if (or perhaps
because) it does not give in to coercion from the rest of the brain.
What is appealing about this separate visual intelligence is that its
mechanisms of inference may be easier to study, unencumbered as
they are with the eager-to-please variability of ordinary cognition
as measured in laboratory settings. So when we look at what has
been uncovered about visual cognition, we of course believe that
these processes may be duplicated in the far murkier reaches of
the prefrontal cortex for decision and conﬂict resolution at a broad-
er conscious level of cognition. Visual cognition is a sort of in vivo
lab preparation for studying the ineffable processes of all of
cognition.
Some of the key works that deﬁned visual cognition and ad-
vanced it over the years are by Irv Rock, who presented the core
of visual cognition as the logic of perception (Rock, 1985). ShimonUllman explored visual routines as a framework for computation
by the visual system (1984, 1996). Donald Hoffman surveyed the
perception of shape, light, and motion, demonstrating the raw
intelligence required for each (Hoffman, 1998). Steve Kosslyn out-
lined an architecture for high-level vision (Kosslyn, Flynn, Amster-
dam, & Wang, 1990). Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs (1992)
proposed the inﬂuential concept of object ﬁles. Pylyshyn (1989,
2001, 2006, 2007) introduced the idea of indexing. Ken Nakayama,
Phil Kellman, Shin Shimojo, Richard Gregory and others present the
mid-level rule structures for making good inferences. Some topics
related to visual inferences are part of the executive and data
structures at the end of this review and are also covered in other
reviews in this issue (Kingdom, 2011; Morgan, 2011).
Across all the different approaches to top-down, mid-, and high-
level vision and visual cognition, the common theme is that there
are multiple possible solutions. The retinal information is not en-
ough to specify the percept and a variety of other information, gen-
erally called object knowledge, is called on to solve the problem.
The literature to date consists of efforts to label the steps and the
classes of process that make the call to extraretinal knowledge,
but as yet there is little understanding or speciﬁcation of the mech-
anisms involved. Basically, object knowledge happens, problem
solved. What we would like to know is how the visual system se-
lects the candidate objects that provide the object knowledge. We
need to know the format of the input data that contacts object
memory and the method by which the object data inﬂuences the
construction of the appropriate model, not to mention what the
format is for the model of the scene. In Section 1, we will survey
papers on routines, executive functions, and architecture: how to
set up image analysis as a sequence of operations on image data
and on ‘‘object ﬁles’’ within an overall architecture for visual cog-
nition. In Section 2 we will survey papers on the different levels
of scene representation: object structure and material properties,
spatial layout, and lighting. In Section 3, we cover dynamic scene
attributes like motion, causality, agency, and events. Finally, we
will look at the interaction of vision with the rest of the brain:
information exchange and resource sharing.
This survey covers many topics chosen idiosyncratically, some
straying outside vision as visual cognition is intimately intercon-
nected with other high-level functions across the brain. Many
important contributions have been undoubtedly omitted, some
inadvertently, and others have fallen through the cracks between
the many reviews in this issue. My apologies for these omissions.
Several specialized and general texts have covered much of what
is mentioned here and the reader is referred to Enns (2004), Greg-
ory (2009), Hoffman (1998), Palmer (1999), Pashler (1998), and
Ullman (1996), for example.
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Several point to the work of Marr (1982), Ullman (1984) and
others as the introduction of the ‘‘computer metaphor’’ into vision
research. But of course, it is not really a metaphor as brains in gen-
eral and the visual system in particular do compute outcomes from
input. We are therefore addressing physical processes realized in
neural hardware that we hope eventually to catalog, locate and
understand. Routines that might compute things like connected-
ness, belonging, support, closure, articulation, and trajectories have
been the focus of small number of books and articles (Kellman &
Shipley, 1991; Pinker, 1984; Rock, 1985; Roelfsema, 2005; Ullman,
1984, 1996; among others). These authors have proposed data
structures that represent visual entities (Kahneman et al., 1992;
Pylyshyn, 1989, 2001, 2006, 2007), processing strategies to con-
struct them (Ullman, 1984), and veriﬁcation steps to maintain con-
sistency between the internal constructs and the incoming retinal
data (Mumford, 1992).2.1. Architecture
On a structural level, several dichotomies have been proposed
for visual processing. Most notably, the processing in the ventral
stream and dorsal streamwere distinguished as processing of what
vs where (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982), or action vs perception
(Milner & Goodale, 2008). These anatomical separations for differ-
ent classes of processing have led to numerous articles supporting
and challenging this distinction. Similarly, Kosslyn et al. (1990)
proposed a distinction between processing of categorical vs contin-
uous properties in the left and right hemispheres respectively. Ulti-
mately, these dichotomies should constrain how visual cognition is
organized but little has come of this yet, other than to restate the
dichotomy in various new data sets. Marr (1982) famously sug-
gested tackling vision on three levels: computation, algorithm
and implementation. It is on his computational level where the
architecture is speciﬁed and, in his case, he argued for an initial pri-
mal sketch with contours and regions (see Morgan, 2011), followed
by a 2½D sketch where textures and surfaces would be repre-
sented, followed by a full 3D model of the scene. Marr’s sugges-
tions inspired a great deal of research but his proposed
architecture has been mostly superseded. Rensink (2000), for
example, has proposed an overall architecture for vision that sep-
arates low-level visual system that processes features from two
high-level systems, one attention based that focuses on the current
objects of interest and one that is non-attentional that processes
the gist and layout of the scene (Fig. 4). Rensink does not make
any anatomical attributions for the different subsystems of this
architecture.2.2. Visual routines
Routines do thework of visual cognition, and their appearance in
the psychological literature marked the opening of modern visual
cognition, following close on earlier work in computer vision (c.f.,
Barrow & Tenenbaum, 1981; Rosenfeld, 1969; Winston, 1975). Shi-
monUllman outlined a suggested set of visual routines (1984, 1996)
as did Shimamura (2000) and Roelfsema (2005). These proposals
dealt with the components of executive attention and working
memory that are supported by routines of selection, maintenance,
updating, and rerouting of information. Ullman pointed out exam-
ples of simple visual tasks that could be solvedwith an explicit, seri-
ally executed algorithm. Often the steps of Ullman’s visual routines
were not obvious, nor were they always available to introspection.
In the tasks that Ullman examined (e.g., Fig. 5a), the subject re-
sponded rapidly, often within a second or less (Jolicoeur, Ullman,& Mackay, 1986, 1991; Ullman, 1984). The answer appeared with
little conscious thought, or with few deliberations that could be re-
ported. Is the reddot in Fig. 5a inside or outside the contour?Wecer-
tainly have to set ourselves to the task but the steps along theway to
the answer seem to leave few traces that we can describe explicitly.
This computation of connectedness that follows the pathwithin the
contours of Fig. 5a was followed by several related tasks where ex-
plicit contours were tracked in order to report if two points were on
the same line (Fig. 5b). Physiological experiments have evidence of
this path tracing operation in the visual cortex of monkeys (Roelf-
sema & et al., 1998).
2.3. Indexing targets
The conclusion of this early work is that there is some active
operation that follows a path and the operator is directly detect-
able in the cortex as it moves along the path (Roelfsema et al.,
1998). Many agree that this operator is plausibly a movable focus
of attention and that these results are directly linked to the other
major paradigm of path tracking, multiple object tracking (Pyly-
shyn & Storm, 1988). The key point of these results is that attention
is providing a continuously changing output during the task but
without anymeaningful access to how the tracking, path following,
or region ﬁlling is accomplished.
Summing up, Ullman (1984, 1996) and others have suggested
that a structure of routines lies behind the sophisticated and rapid
processing of visual scenes. The overall architecture here remains
only dimly deﬁned. We could suggest some names for the routines
like select, track, open object ﬁle, save to memory, retrieve, save to
object ﬁle, as well as hierarchies of types of routines (Cavanagh,
2004). Clearly, for the moment at least, this exercise is a bit fanci-
ful. In the absence of behavioral and physiological evidence for
speciﬁc routines as actual processing components, wishing them
to exist does not get us very far. Nevertheless, of the potential rou-
tines and components, the selection function of attention has re-
ceived most research and continuing redeﬁnition.
2.4. Visual executive functions: attention
We might consider this movable point of information uptake –
the focus of attention according to Ullman – as so far the key ele-
ment in high-level vision. It selects and passes information onto
higher level processes which we can assume include identiﬁcation
and what Kahneman et al. (1992) have called object ﬁles, tempo-
rary data structures opened for each item of interest. Pylyshyn
(1989, 2001, 2006, 2007) has written about the closely related
operation of indexing an object’s location – a Finger of Instantia-
tion – from which data can be selected. Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook,
and Rao (1997) also describe similar properties of deictic codes
that index locations while performing visually guided tasks. Pyly-
shyn (1989) proposed that his FINSTs were independent of atten-
tion and Kahneman, Treisman and Gibbs were originally agnostic
on the relation between object ﬁles and attention. Nevertheless,
the functions attributed to spatial attention overlap so extensively
with the functions of indexing and those of the temporary data
structures, that there seems to be no compelling reason yet to keep
them separate (although see Mitroff, Scholl, & Wynn, 2005). The
primary behavior consequences of indexing, selecting or attending
to a location are the ‘‘attentional beneﬁts’’ of improved perfor-
mance and target identiﬁcation. This localized attentional beneﬁt
was described by Posner (1980) as a ‘‘spotlight’’ and a vast ﬁeld
of research has followed the properties and dynamics of this aspect
of attention (see Carrasco, 2011). Here we will look not at the ben-
eﬁts conveyed by attention but at the properties and limits of the
system that controls it. We ﬁrst look at how attended locations
may be coded and the evidence that attentional beneﬁts are con-
Fig. 4. Rensink’s (2000) triadic architecture for the visual system. Early processes segment proto-objects from the background rapidly and in parallel across the visual ﬁeld.
Focused attention then can access these structures forming an individuated object with both temporal and spatial coherence. Information about the context or gist acquired
outside of attention guides attention to various locations and sets scene priorities or salience.
Fig. 5. Tracing and tracking. A movable indexing operator can trace through the paths of the ﬁgure in (a) to determine whether the red dot lies inside or outside a closed
contour (Ullman, 1984). In (b) a similar operator can trace along the line from the red dot to see if the green dot falls on the same line (Jolicoeur et al., 1991). In (c) the three
red tokens are tracked as they move (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988). They revert to green after a short interval and the subject keeps tracking.
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why this architecture would impose a capacity limit to the number
of locations that can be attended, as well as a resolution limit to the
size of regions that can be selected. This location management sys-
tem is only one part of attention’s functions however, and we will
end this section with a brief discussion of the non-location aspects
of attention’s architecture. Speciﬁcally, the attended locations need
to be linked to the identity that labels the features at that location
(Fig. 6) to form, as Kahneman et al. (1992) propose, object ﬁles. We
will also need to allow for data structures, short term memory buf-
fers, to keep track of the current task being performed, typically on
an attended target, with links to, for example, current status, cur-
rent target, subsequent steps, and criteria for completion.
2.5. Architecture of attention: location
2.5.1. Target location map, attention pointers
We begin with how attended locations are encoded. Numerous
physiological, fMRI, and behavioral studies have shown that the
spatial allocation of attention is controlled by a map (e.g., salience
map, Itti & Koch, 2001; Treue, 2003) that is also the oculomotor
map for eye movement planning (Rizzolatti & et al., 1987; see re-
view in Awh, Armstrong, & Moore, 2006). Although the cortical
and subcortical areas that are involved have been studied initially
as saccade control areas, the activations on these maps do more
than just indicate or point at a target’s location for purposes of pro-gramming a saccade. Each activation also indexes the location of
that target’s feature information on other similarly organized reti-
notopic maps throughout the brain (Fig. 6). Overall, the link be-
tween these attention/saccade maps and spatial attention is
compelling, indicating that activations on these maps provide the
core function of spatial attention. In particular, attentional beneﬁts
follow causally from the effects these activations have on other
levels of the visual system. The deﬁnitive evidence is given by a
series of outstanding microstimulation studies. When delivering
electric current to cells in saccade control areas with a movement
ﬁeld, for example, in the lower right quadrant, a high stimulating
current triggers a saccade to that location. However, a slightly
weaker stimulation that does not trigger a saccade generates either
enhanced neural response for cells with receptive ﬁelds at that
location (stimulating the Frontal Eye Fields and recording from
cells in area V4, Moore, Armstrong, & Fallah, 2003) or lowered vi-
sual thresholds for visual tests at that location (shown for stimula-
tion of superior colliculus, Muller, Philiastides, & Newsome, 2005).
These ﬁndings indicate that the attentional indexing system is
realized in the activity patterns of these saccade/attention maps
and the effects of their downward projections. This anatomical
framework does not provide any hints as to where or how the loca-
tion, the features, and the identity information are combined (the
triumvirate that constitutes an object ﬁle) nor where or how steps
in visual and attention routines are controlled (see the end of this
section for a discussion).
Fig. 6. Architecture of spatial attention (Cavanagh et al., 2010). A network of areas
form a target map that subserves spatial attention as well as eye movements. Peaks
of activity (in red) index the locations of targets and specify the retinotopic
coordinates at which the target’s feature data are to be found in earlier visual
cortices which are shown, highly simpliﬁed, as a stack of aligned areas divided into
right and left hemiﬁelds with the fovea in the center. In object recognition areas,
cells have very large receptive ﬁelds shown here as a heavy black outline for the
receptive ﬁeld of one cell that specializes in identifying pickup trucks. These cells
must rely on attention to bias input in favor of the target and suppress surrounding
distractors so that only a single item falls in the receptive ﬁeld at any one time. The
surround suppression has to be imposed in early retinotopic areas as the large ﬁelds
in object recognition cannot have local modulation of sensitivity.
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One of the classic deﬁnitions of attention (combined with ﬂex-
ible, localized performance beneﬁts) has been its limited capacity.
If two tasks execute simultaneously with lower performance than
in isolation, they must call on a shared resource, attention (see
Pashler (1998), for a review). This is the basis of the dual task par-
adigm used to evaluate attentional demands of different tasks. The
limit is variously described as a bottleneck or limited attentional
load, or cognitive resources. We can only attend to a few things
at a time, we can only track a few things, we need attention to ﬁlter
down the incoming information because there is just too much of
it.
One of the principle paradigms to explore the capacity of spatial
attention has been the multiple object tracking task (Pylyshyn &
Storm, 1988; see Cavanagh and Alvarez (2005) for a review). In
the initial experiments, accurate performance in this task was lim-
ited to tracking 4 or 5 items – a limit that was intriguingly close to
other cognitive limits in apprehension and short term memory.
Several studies have tested the nature of the information that is
actually tracked. For example, targets are suddenly occluded and
subjects must report location, direction, or identity of the targets.
Location and direction are recalled best (Bahrami, 2003; Pylyshyn,
2004; Saiki, 2003) although some identity is retained if the task re-
quires it (Oksama & Hyöna, 2004). However, further experiments
showed that the tracking limit was not so ﬁxed in value as it could
range from 1 to a maximum of 8 as the speed of the items to be
tracked slowed and the performance showed no special behavior
near the magic number 4 (Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007). Not only
was there no ﬁxed limit (although a maximum of around 8), but
the limit appears to be set independently in the left and right
hemiﬁelds (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005): a tracking task in one
hemiﬁeld did not affect performance in the other; however if the
two tracking tasks were brought into the same hemiﬁeld (keeping
the same separation between them and the same eccentricity),
performance plunged. This hemiﬁeld independence seems most
evident when the task involves location (Delvenne, 2005).
As a cautionary note, this dual tracking task shows that atten-
tion is not a single monolithic resource: performance in the twohemiﬁelds shows attentional independence. The concept that
attention is a single, limited resource underlies the whole industry
of dual task measures of attention demands but this dual tracking
task (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005) puts this whole industry in ques-
tion. For example, in an inﬂuential series of experiments by Koch
and colleagues (Lee, Koch, & Braun, 1997; VanRullen, Reddy, &
Koch, 2004), independence between two tasks was taken as funda-
mental evidence that one of the two tasks required little or no
attentional resources. According to the authors, this second task
did not affect the ﬁrst because it did not draw on any attentional
resources. However, the dual tracking tasks also show indepen-
dence but now the two tasks are identical, so their lack of interfer-
ence cannot be attributed to an asymmetry in their attentional
demands. That would be equivalent to claiming that to accomplish
the same task, one hemiﬁeld is taking all the resources and the
other none. Logically impossible. Clearly, attention is not a unitary
resource.
If the tracking limit reﬂects the capacity of spatial attention to
index multiple locations, then this ﬂexible value (Alvarez & Franco-
neri, 2007) and independence between hemiﬁelds (Alvarez & Cav-
anagh, 2005) rule out the classic notion that there is a ﬁxed
number of slots for attention (or awareness), at least for attention
to locations. In any case, there does appear to be some resource
that limits the number of locations that we can attend to or be
aware of. We might ask, what is this resource? How can we get
more of it? Could we lighten our attentional load? One possibility
is a physical rather than metaphorical resource: real estate, specif-
ically cortical real estate. On the attention/saccade maps (Fig. 6)
each activity peak – each attentional focus – selects a spatial region
for processing beneﬁts and engages surround suppression (Bahcall
& Kowler, 1999; Cutzu & Tsotsos, 2003; Mounts, 2000) to prevent
selection of nearby distractors. There is a ﬁnite amount of space on
the attention map and if there is more than one attended target,
these suppressive surrounds can produce mutual target–target
interference if one activity peak falls in the suppressive surround
of another. This target–target interference may be a key factor lim-
iting the number of locations that can be simultaneously attended
(Carlson, Alvarez, & Cavanagh, 2007; Shim, Alvarez, & Jiang, 2008).
The limited resource is therefore the space on the attention map
over which attended targets can be spread out without overlapping
their suppressive surrounds. Once the suppressive surrounds over-
lap target locations, performance is degraded and the capacity lim-
it has been reached.
2.5.3. Resolution of spatial attention
An additional limit to selection arises if two objects are too close
to be isolated in a single selection region. When items are too close
to be individuated – when they cannot be resolved by attention –
they cannot be identiﬁed, counted or tracked (He, Cavanagh, &
Intriligator, 1996; Intriligator & Cavanagh, 2001). Attentional reso-
lution is ﬁnest at the fovea and coarser in the periphery, like visual
resolution, but 10 times or so worse so that there are many tex-
tures where we can see the items, they are above visual resolution,
but we cannot individuate or count them. Our attentional resolu-
tion is so poor that if our visual resolution were that bad, we would
be legally blind. There is an equivalent, coarse limit for the tempo-
ral resolution for attention as well. Events changing at rates of
higher than 7 Hz cannot be individuated (Verstraten, Cavanagh, &
Labianca, 2000) even though the presence of changes can be de-
tected up to 50 Hz or more (see Holcombe, 2009).
2.6. Architecture of attention: non-location aspects
2.6.1. Features
Spatial attention is intensively studied at behavioral and phys-
iological levels because of its accessible anatomical grounding in
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but equally important (see Carrasco (2011) and Nakayama and
Martini (2011) for more details). Feature attention provides access
to locations based on features but does so across the entire visual
ﬁeld (Maunsell & Treue, 2006; Melcher, Papathomas, & Vid-
nyánszky, 2005; Saenz, Buracas, & Boynton, 2002). Aside from this
intriguing property of spatial non-speciﬁcity and a great deal of re-
search on which features can drive this response, little is known
yet about the centers that control it, the speciﬁcity of the projec-
tions from those centers to earlier visual cortices, nor how those
projection then promote the locations of the targeted features to
activity on the saccade/attention salience map (producing ‘‘pop-
out’’, see Wolfe & Horowitz (2004)).
2.6.2. Binding and object ﬁles
An attention map (Fig. 6) may specify where targets are, and so
provide access to that target’s features, but is that all there is to the
‘‘binding problem’’? Treisman (1988) proposed that this binding –
the bundling together of the various features of an object – was
accomplished by attention on a master map of locations that fa-
mously glued together the features found at those locations on
independent feature maps. This suggestion was followed by many
articles that supported and challenged it (see Nakayama & Martini,
2011). Indeed, some authors proposed that co-localization was all
that was happening (Clark, 2004; Zeki, 2001; Zeki & Bartels, 1999).
Speciﬁcally, features that were concurrently active in different,
specialized areas of the visual cortex were ‘‘bound’’ together by de-
fault, by virtue of being co-localized – having the same position on
the various retinotopic cortical maps for different features (Mel-
cher & Vidnyánszky, 2006). Our description of attentional pointers
(Cavanagh, Hunt, Afraz, & Rolfs, 2010) provides a location to be co-
localized to (Fig. 6) and the set of features within the attended
location speciﬁed by the pointer are ‘‘bound’’ in the sense that they
are read out or accessed together. This version of binding by co-
localization with an attentional pointer differs from Treisman’s ori-
ginal proposal only in the absence of some ‘‘glue’’, some sense in
which the features are linked together by more than just retinotop-
ic coincidence. Indeed, there may be more going on than just co-
localization and the extra piece to this puzzle is provided by an-
other suggestion of Kahneman et al. (1992), that of the object ﬁle.
This is a temporary data structure that tallies up the various fea-
tures of an object, speciﬁcally an attended object. Once the location
of an object is speciﬁed, its characteristics of location, identity and
features can be collected. This is a hypothetical construct but crit-
ically important for bridging the gap between a target’s location
and its identity. This data structure, wherever and whatever it is
(see Cavanagh et al., 2010) may provide the difference between
simple localization, perhaps equivalent to the ‘‘proto-objects’’ of
Rensink (2000), and truly bound features. Multiple item tracking
tasks appear to depend more on the localization functions of atten-
tion, perhaps the ‘‘proto-object’’ level, than on the bound position
and features of the tracked targets. Tracking capacity is reduced
dramatically if subjects must keep track of identity as well as loca-
tion (Oksama & Hyöna, 2004). Some behavioral evidence of the
properties of previously attended (Wolfe, Klempen, & Dahlen,
2000) or brieﬂy attended (Rauschenberger & Yantis, 2001) items
also suggests that something observable actually happens to these
co-localized features once the ‘‘object ﬁle’’ is ﬁnalized.
2.6.3. Buffers for task execution
There are many functions lumped together in the current liter-
ature as ‘‘attention’’. This is certainly a great sin of simpliﬁcation
that will appear amusingly naïve at some future date, but it is what
we do now. We include the processes that maintain contact with
the target object – tracking, tracing, and solving the correspon-
dence problem – as part of attention. Many authors also includethe data structures and short term memory buffers that keep track
of the current task being performed as components of the atten-
tional overhead. Overwhelm any of these with too much ‘‘atten-
tional load’’ (c.f., Lavie, 2005) and processing suffers. At some
point these different components and functions will have their
own labels.
For the moment, I only point out that these are necessary ele-
ments of visual cognition. Object ﬁles are candidates for one type
of buffer that holds information on current targets. Processing also
needs a temporary buffer for other task details required to run the
visual routines that do the work. These buffers may reside in the
prefrontal cortex or span frontal and parietal areas (Deco & Rolls,
2005; Lepsein & Nobre, 2006; Rossi, Pessoa, Desimone, & Ungerle-
ider, 2009). We can assume that these details – current operation,
current sequence of operations, criteria for terminating – take
space in a short term memory that may be visual or general. None
of the papers of this special issue deal with visual short termmem-
ory nor its interaction with attention, an extremely active ﬁeld but
several recent reviews cover these topics (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006;
Deco & Rolls, 2005; Funahashi, 2006; McAfoose & Baune, 2009;
Smith & Ratcliff, 2009).
To make a little more sense of the very vague notion of routines,
I previously proposed that we can divide them (Cavanagh, 2004)
into three levels: vision routines, attention routines, and cognitive
routines. Let’s put vision routines on the bottom rank, as auto-
mated processes that are inaccessible to awareness. Some of these
might be hardwired from birth (e.g. computation of opponent color
responses), others might emerge with early visual experience (e.g.
effectiveness of pictorial cues), and still others may be dependent
on extensive practice (e.g. text recognition). Attention routines,
in contrast, would be consciously initiated by setting a goal or a ﬁl-
ter or a selection target and they have a reportable outcome but no
reportable intermediate steps. Their intermediate steps are a se-
quence of vision routines. Examples of attention routines might
be selecting a target (ﬁnd the red item), tracking, binding, identify-
ing, and exchanging descriptions and requests with other modules
(Logan & Zbrodoff, 1999). Finally, at the top level of the hierarchy,
cognitive routines would have multiple steps involving action,
memory, vision and other senses where there are several report-
able intermediate states. They are overall much broader than vi-
sion itself. Each individual step is a call to one attention routine.
Examples might be baking a cake, driving home, or brain surgery.
Attention routines divide the ﬂow of mental activity at its bound-
aries where the content of awareness changes: new goals are set,
new outcomes are computed and these enter and exit awareness
as one of the key working buffers of these mental tasks. If attention
routines are a real component of visual cognition, this accessibility
will help catalog and study them.
Summing up, Ullman and colleagues’ work on path tracing and
region ﬁlling and then Pylyshyn and colleagues’ work on tracking
moving targets have brought new approaches to the study of
attention. Various experiments have measured capacity and infor-
mation properties of this particular type of attention and laid out
physiological networks that would underlie their operation (Cava-
nagh et al., 2010). Kahneman, Treisman and Gibbs’s (1992) pro-
posal of object ﬁles has ﬁlled another niche as a necessary, much
desired function with little, as yet, supporting evidence either
behavioral or physiological. These many new branches of attention
research have shown signiﬁcant growth over the past 25 years, and
are currently the most active area of high-level vision.3. Surfaces, depth, light and shadow
From the highest level of visual system architecture, we move
to the lowest level that may still rely on inference and so can still
Fig. 8. Border ownership. (a) The front surface owns the border, allowing the back
surface to extend under it as amodal completion. The T-junctions here establish the
black square as in front, owning the border between the black and gray areas. The
gray area completes forming an amodal square so that searching for the image
feature – the L shape – is actually quite difﬁcult (He & Nakayama, 1992) (b) Qiu and
von der Heydt (2005) report that some cells tuned to orientation are also selective
to which surface, left or right, owns the border. One cell may preferentially ﬁre to
the border with the object in front on its left whereas another cell may prefer the
front surface, as deﬁned only by contour cues, even without disparity information,
to be on the right.
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faces, materials, layout, light and shadow. The use of inference here
is open to debate however. Some of the analysis at this level could
call on bottom up processes like the sequence of ﬁlters (receptive
ﬁelds) underlies holistic face recognition (Tsao & Livingstone,
2008; Turk & Pentland, 1991) and the cooperative networks that
converge on the best descriptions of surfaces and contours (Gross-
berg & Mingolla, 1985; Marr, 1982). These would process retinal
input directly, without branching to alternative, context-depen-
dent descriptions based on non-retinal information. There are nev-
ertheless many examples where object knowledge does play a role
and these suggest that, at least in some cases, inference is required
to, for example, link up surfaces (Fig 7c), or differentiate shadow
from dark pigment (Fig. 3).
The ﬁrst step in piecing together the parts of an object is to put
together its contours and surfaces, a process called completion by
many if there is only partial information in the image. Many of the
properties of grouping and good continuation, studied for a cen-
tury, contribute to these early steps. Gregory (1972) and others
pioneered the use of sparse images that led to ﬁlling in with the
‘‘best’’ explanation; cognitive and subjective contours (Fig. 7).
Avoiding the label of mid-level vision, Gregory referred to these
inﬂuences as rules that were neither top-down nor bottom up,
but ‘‘from the side’’ (Gregory, 2009). Solid conceptual work in this
area was introduced by Kellman and Shipley (1991) in their papers
on unit formation: the lawful relation between contours that lead
to joining various bits together across gaps and occluders. Nakay-
ama and colleagues (Nakayama, He, & Shimojo, 1995; Nakayama,
Shimojo, & Silverman, 1989) underlined the importance of attrib-
uting ownership to a contour: it belongs to the nearer surface
and pieces of contour of the far surface can link up underneath that
near surface (Sadja & Finkel, 1995). Qiu and von der Heydt (2005)
added spectacular physiological evidence to this aspect of border
ownership showing that some cells in area V2 responded to a line
only if it was owned by the surface to its, say, left; whereas other
cells would respond to the same line only if it belonged to the sur-
face on the right (see Fig. 8). This is one of the most impressive
pieces of physiological evidence for visual functions that depend
on the overall visual scene layout remote from the receptive ﬁeld
of the cell.
The choices for how the surfaces are combined are not always
logical – a cat may come out impossibly long, for example – but
these choices appear to be driven by the priority given to connect-
ing collinear segments that both end in T-junctions (e.g. Kellman &
Shipley, 1991). Given this very lawful behavior, we might askFig. 7. Cognitive contours, unit formation and relatedness. (a) Gregory (1972)
pointed out that we may perceive a shape covering the disks to most easily explain
the missing bits of disks. This ﬁgure suggests that the collinear edges may be more
important than the ‘‘cognitive’’ shape as here the shapes and their depth order are
unstable but the subjective contours remain. (b) Kellman and Shipley (1991)
proposed a set of principles underlying relatedness that drives the linking of
contours and surfaces. (c) Tse (1999a, 1999b) showed that the relatedness was not
necessarily at the level of image contours as in this example a volume appears to
link behind the cylinder in the absence of any collinear contours.whether there is anything really inferential here. Indeed, Grossberg
and Mingolla (1985) and Grossberg (1993, 1997) have modeled the
majority of these examples within a cooperative neural network
that requires no appeal to ‘‘object knowledge’’. However, these
straightforward examples give a restricted picture of the range of
completion phenomena. Tse (1999a, 1999b) has shown that there
is quite good completion seen for objects that have no collinear
line segments and that appear to depend on a concept of an object
volume even though it is an arbitrary volume. Clearly, there is
more going on here than can be explained by image-based rules
(Fig. 7c). Some consideration of potential volumes has to enter into
the choice. According to Tse (1999a, 1999b) object knowledge here
can be as minimal as the property of being an object – having a
bounded volume – and not necessarily on characteristic properties
of a recognized, familiar object.
One critical principle contributing to the inferences of 3D sur-
face structure is the distinction between generic vs accidental
views (Freeman, 1994; Nakayama & Shimojo, 1992). One surface
that overlaps another will be seen to make T-junctions at the
points of occlusion from the great majority of viewing angles. A
cube has a generic view with three surfaces visible, the side (2 sur-
faces) or end views (1 surface) are accidental directions and of
much lower frequency from arbitrary viewpoints. This generic
view principle helps reduce the number of possible (likely) inter-
pretations for a given image structure.
Similar examples of the importance of object or scene knowl-
edge are seen in the processing of shadows. In extreme examples
like Mooney faces or other two-tone images (look at Fig. 3 again),
these are simply dark regions with nothing that particularly spec-
iﬁes whether they are dark pigment or a less well illuminated part
of the scene. In this case, a ﬁrst guess of what object might be pres-
ent is required to break the ambiguity of dark pigment vs dark sha-
dow as no other image analysis based on parts or surfaces can
work as shadow boundaries have broken actual object parts into
accidental islands of black or white (Cavanagh, 1991). Two-tone
representations do not occur in nature scenes but they are never-
theless readily recognized by infants (Farzin, Rivera, & Whitney,
2010) and by newborns (Leo & Simion, 2009). This suggests that
the objects are not recovered by specialized processes that have
been acquired to deal speciﬁcally with two-tone images, which
newborns are unlikely to have encountered, but by general pur-
pose visual processes capable of disentangling dark shadow and
dark pigment based on object knowledge. These processes would
evolve for ordinary scenes where there are often redundant cues
to help dissociate dark shadow from dark pigment. In the case of
two-tone images, however, only object-based recovery is capable
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that can give us access to these mid-level inferential processes in
isolation.
Once a shadow has been identiﬁed as such, it provides informa-
tion both about spatial layout and illumination. The separation be-
tween the object and its shadow inﬂuences the object’s perceived
3D location in the scene as shown by Pascal Mamassian and col-
leagues (Kersten, Knill, Mamassian, & Bülthoff, 1996; Mamassian,
Knill, & Kersten, 1998). The processes linking the shadow and the
object are, however, quite tolerant of discrepancies (Fig. 9) that
are physically impossible (Cavanagh, 2005; Ostrovsky, Cavanagh,
& Sinha, 2005). The information that a dark region is a shadow also
contributes to processes that recover the surface reﬂectance (Gil-
christ et al., 1999; see Kingdom, 2011). Correcting for the illumina-
tion only recovers relative reﬂectance – which area inside the
shadow may have similar reﬂectance to areas outside the shadow.
An additional process is required to assign absolute reﬂectance –
which area actually looks white as opposed to gray. Gilchrist has
shown that certain image properties lead to an assignment of
white in general to the most reﬂective surface and this acts as an
anchor so that other surfaces are scaled accordingly (Gilchrist
et al., 1999).
Summing up, Gregory and others established sparse ﬁgures,
subjective contours and completion phenomena as a fruitful work-
shop for studying principles of surface and object construction.
Kellman and Shipley (1991) demonstrated how contour related-
ness could support the speciﬁcation of which surfaces belonged to-
gether, a process they called unit formation. Nakayama and
Shimojo (1992) emphasized the concept of border ownership and
generic views as a key step in understanding surfaces and how
they are arranged and joined. van der Heydt (Qiu, Sugihara, &
von der Heydt, 2007; Qiu & von der Heydt, 2005) demonstrated
that there was evidence in the visual cortex for these processes
of extracting subjective contours and assigning border ownership.
Grossberg (1993, 1997; Grossberg & Mingolla, 1985) showed that
neural networks could solve many of these same surface comple-
tion puzzles based on simple boundary and surface systems that
interact. Tse (1999a, 1999b) demonstrated that completion ex-
tended to more complex situations, relying on object properties
that went beyond image-based continuity. Gilchrist extended the
resolution of image ambiguity into the domain of lightness (Gil-
christ et al., 1999).4. Objects
What is an object? An object is the fundamental component of
visual processing; it is the lynchpin on which so much else hangs.
But, embarrassingly, no one has a good deﬁnition (see Feldman,
2003; Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004; Spelke, 1990; Scholl, 2001). TheFig. 9. Shadows. A shadow region is taken as a change of illumination not a change
in pigment. These inferences of light and reﬂectance are made in these two
examples even though the two shadows are obviously impossible (Ostrovsky et al.,
2005).deﬁnition may be lacking but the research is not (see excellent re-
view in Walther & Koch, 2007). In addition to objects, we may also
need a category for ‘‘proto-objects’’ (see Rensink, 2000), the status
of segmented potential objects available prior to selection by
attention. The necessity of this level of representation is clear when
we consider that object-based attention can only exist if objects
exist so that attention can access them (Moore, Yantis, & Vaughan,
1998). A second piece of evidence for proto-objects is the ability of
humans and other species to make rapid judgments of approxi-
mate number of elements in a scene (Dehaene, 1992, 1997; Hal-
berda, Sires, & Feigenson, 2006). The judgments of number are
not affected by large variations in the sizes, brightness or shapes
of each item suggesting that each item must be segmented from
the background and treated as an individual element (Allik & Tuul-
mets, 1991) prior to access by attention and independently of
whether the inter-element spacing allows individuation of the ele-
ments by attention. It is not clear yet what the differences are be-
tween this pre-attentive object representation and the post-
attentive representation.
4.1. Object structure
Several authors in computer vision proposed that the various
junctions on solid and curved objects form a set of constraints that
determine the ﬁnal volume bounded by these contours and junc-
tions (c.f., Barrow & Tenenbaum, 1981; Malik, 1987). This approach
was very much bottom up, making no call on knowledge of poten-
tial objects, only on the regularities of the junctions and constraints
they impose on 3D structure. The work in this area was detailed
and analytical but despite the clarity of the proposals, or perhaps
because of it, the difﬁculty in extracting the initial contour descrip-
tion from the image ended the efforts in this area (although see El-
der, 1999). Others have worked on the fundamental nature of
objects whereby the concave and convex extrema around an object
boundary are a diagnostic code of the object shape. Richards and
Hoffman (1985) called this the codon theory and the importance
of these two boundary features has been followed up more re-
cently by Barenholtz, Cohen, Feldman, and Singh (2003).
4.2. Object recognition
Others worked on the structure of an object and its parts as a
code for known objects, allowing retrieval of more object knowl-
edge to ﬁll in details of the object missing in the image. Marr
and Biederman among others have stressed the power of an ob-
ject-description format that can be easily extracted from the image
and compared to memory. They considered objects to be a com-
pendium of parts: either simple cylindrical volumes (Marr, 1982)
or a set of basic volumes (Biederman, 1987) or more ﬂexible vol-
umes (superquadrics, Pentland, 1987). The object description was
given by the spatial relation among these parts: what was joined
to what and where. These simpliﬁed objects captured some inner
essence of objects and were often quite recognizable, in the same
way that Johansson’s animated point-light walkers were compel-
lingly walking humans. There were again issues about how exactly
to get to the object descriptions from the image data but the
importance of this part-based level of object description was clear
and these proposals have had enormous inﬂuence.
The basic approach of these volumetric object schemes is to
have an object description that is view invariant. The parts are de-
tected independent of view direction and their structure is coded
in an object-centered reference frame. The code therefore solves
the problem of how to identify objects from many different view-
points. On the other hand, there is evidence that object recognition
by humans shows viewpoint dependence (Rock & DiVita, 1987).
Some proposals do suggest viewpoint dependent representations
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Edelman, & Tarr, 1995; Cavanagh, 1991; Fukushima, 1980; Logo-
thetis, Pauls, Bülthoff, & Poggio, 1994; Poggio & Edelman, 1990;
Sinha & Poggio, 1996). This of course requires that multiple views
of each object can be stored and can be matched to image data
independently of size or location.
4.3. Context
One consistent result is that objects (and scenes) appear to be
processed from a global level to local. According to Bar (2004)
some low spatial frequency information is sufﬁcient to generate
some gist or context (Oliva & Torralba, 2006) that acts as a frame-
work to ﬁll in the rest (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999). Bar has
demonstrated this progression with priming studies as has Sanocki
(1993). This order of processing effect is perhaps different from the
order of access effect – the reverse hierarchy proposal (Hochstein &
Ahissar, 2002) – whereby high-level descriptions are more readily
available for visual search and/or conscious inspection. For exam-
ple, we see a face before we can inspect the shape of its constituent
features (Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1995). The reverse hierarchy pro-
posal does not require that high-level descriptions are computed
ﬁrst, although it does not rule that out either.
4.4. Object beneﬁts
Finally, others have explored behavioral consequences of
‘‘objecthood’’. Scholl, Pylyshyn, and Feldman (2001) used a multi-
ple object tracking task to examine what features are essential
for good tracking – with the assumption that good tracking re-
quired good objects (Fig. 10). They found that targets that were
connected to others or that ﬂowed like a liquid (VanMarle & Scholl,
2003) were difﬁcult to track. Franconeri, Bemis, and Alvarez (2009)
followed a similar approach but asked what properties led to more
accurate numerosity estimates. Judgments of numerosity are very
relevant because they call on an early segmentation of the scene
into objects or proto-objects so that the numerosity is independent
of the perceptual properties of the items: their size or brightness or
shape or organization. Numerosity was affected, however, by the
same manipulations that inﬂuenced tracking – objects that ap-
peared to connect to others appeared to be less numerous. Finally
a series of studies examined what constituted an object so that it
could cast a shadow or have a highlight (Rensink & Cavanagh,
2004). The studies exploited visual search tasks that showed aFig. 10. What is an object that it can be tracked (Scholl et al., 2001). What happens
if you try to track a part of an item? Can that part be considered an ‘‘object’’ so that
you can track it without interference from the rest of the item? This study took a
standard tracking display like that on the left where subjects tracked the items
initially marked with red (actual trials presented four targets and four distractors).
To test the nature of the objects that could be tracked, pairs of targets and
distractors were joined as lines or bars (right hand two panels). The end points of
the lines or bars moved on exactly the same trajectories as in the standard display
and if an end point could be considered an object, tracking should not be affected. In
fact, performance plummeted, suggesting that there is an intrinsic object that is the
minimum unit on which attention can operate. In this case, the minimum object
appeared to be the full line or bar so that a target endpoint had to be deﬁned as a
speciﬁc end of a particular tracked bar, perhaps doubling the information required
for tracking.search cost for detecting an odd angled shape when it was seen
as a shadow compared to when it was seen as pigment. The cost
was eliminated if the object casting the shadow had no volume
that could cast a shadow. These studies show that even though
we do not know what an object is, we may be able to catalog the
instances where ‘‘object-like’’ entities produce processing advanta-
ges (or disadvantages).
To sum up, the concept of an object is notoriously difﬁcult to
deﬁne. Nevertheless, several very inﬂuential proposals have been
made to specify how 3D structure of an object can be decoded from
its 2D contours, through sets of junction types, or non-accidental
features, or convex and concave extrema. Independently of the re-
trieval of 3D structure, other proposals have addressed the possi-
bility of object identiﬁcation based on volumetric modeling of
the object’s part structure or view-dependent prototype matching
and this work has led to scores of articles and applications in bio-
logical and computer vision. This area has been among the most
fruitful domains of vision research in the past 25 years. Others like
Bar (2004) have extended the schemata (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser,
1967), frames and scripts (Minsky, 1975; Schank & Abelson,
1977) of context to show how low-spatial frequencies can provide
the global, contextual information that facilitates object recogni-
tion. Finally, several studies have reverse-engineered object-supe-
riority and object-inferiority effects to explore the space of
objecthood: what is an object that it may be counted or tracked
or cast a shadow.5. Motion, action, causality, agency, events
There is more to vision that just recognition of objects in static
scenes. The true power of vision is its ability to be predictive, to see
things coming before they happen to you. And the most useful
information for prediction is of course the motion of objects in
the scene. In fact, it is so useful that two separate motion systems
appear to have evolved quite independently, one a reﬂexive low-
level system and the other an active, attention-based, high-level
system (Anstis, 1980; Braddick, 1974, 1980; Cavanagh, 1992; Lu
& Sperling, 1996). The low-level system does not call on inference
or other advanced processing strategies but the high-level system
does. Rock (1985), for example, showed how ambiguous apparent
motion stimuli could be seen in more than one organization
depending on cues in the stimulus or instructions. As he suggested,
this demonstrated that there was a logic underlying the percept.
Like subjective contours, there was a ‘‘subjective’’ motion path, a
space–time contour that best explained the partial image data.
Other examples of momentum and organization in apparent mo-
tion have been used to make similar points (Anstis & Ramachan-
dran, 1987). If the object seen in motion has certain properties
these can constrain the interpretation. For example, Chatterjee,
Freyd, and Shiffrar (1996) have shown that the perception of
ambiguous apparent motion involving human bodies usually
avoids implausible paths where body parts would have to cross
through each other.
Motion can tell us more than where an object is going, it can
also tell us what the object is. The characteristic motions of famil-
iar objects like a pencil bouncing on a table, a butterﬂy in ﬂight, or
a closing door, can support the recognition of these objects. In re-
turn, once the object and its stereotypical motion are recognized,
knowledge of that motion can support the continuing percept. Like
the ﬁrst notes of a familiar tune, our knowledge can guide our
hearing of the remainder of the melody, ﬁlling in missing notes.
Selfridge (1959) had argued that shape recognition was supported
by legions of ‘‘daemons’’ each of which searched for its matching
pattern in the scene and signaled when it showed up. In a related
paper (Cavanagh, Labianca, & Thornton, 2001), we proposed dy-
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processing of characteristic, stereotyped motions. ‘‘Sprites’’ are
routines responsible for detecting the presence of a speciﬁc charac-
teristic motion in the input, for modeling or animating the object’s
changing conﬁguration as it makes its stereotypical motion, and for
ﬁlling in the predictable details of the motion over time and in the
face of noisy or absent image details. Point-light walkers make this
point most compellingly. A human form is easily recognized from
the motions of a set of lights attached to a person ﬁlmed while
walking in the dark (Johansson, 1973; Neri, Morrone, & Burr,
1998). Johansson (1973) proposed that the analysis relied on an
automatic and spontaneous extraction of mathematically lawful
spatiotemporal relations. However, in the paper on sprites, visual
search tasks showed that point-light walkers could only be ana-
lyzed one at a time. Perception of this compelling, characteristic
motion required attention.
The idea that there is a story behind a motion percept is a sim-
ple version of the even more intriguing effects of intentionality and
causality. The original demonstrations by Michotte (1946) for cau-
sality and by Heider and Simmel (1944) for intentionality have
captivated students of vision for decades. These effects demon-
strate a level of ‘‘explanation’’ behind the motion paths that is, to
say the least, quite rich. It suggests that the unconscious inferences
of the visual system may include models of goals of others as well
as some version of the rules of physics. If a ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ could
be shown to be independently resident in the visual system, it
would be a sign that our visual systems, on their own, rank with
the most advanced species in cognitive evolution. Well, that has
not yet been demonstrated and there have only been a few articles
on causality in visual research over the past 25 years (Scholl &
Tremoulet, 2000; Scholl & Nakayama, 2002; Falmier & Young,
2008). Many more studies have focused on the perception of inten-
tion, agency and the animate vs inanimate distinction, especially in
children (Blakemore & Decety, 2004; Rutherford, Pennington, &
Rogers, 2006; Schlottmann & Ray, 2010).
Beyond the logic, the story and the intentions implicit in per-
ceived motion lies an entire level of visual representation that is
perhaps the most important and least studied of all. Events make
up the units of our visual experience like sentences and paragraphs
do in written language. We see events with discrete beginnings,
central actions and deﬁnite end points. This syntactic structure of
the ﬂow of events undoubtedly inﬂuences how we experience
the components within an event as closely spaced in time just as
the Gestalt laws describe how we see grouped items as closer to-
gether in space than they are. One lab has been responsible for
the major portion of research on visual events (Zacks, Speer, Swal-
low, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001) and has
been able to show a number of fundamental properties arising
from our processing of elements grouped together over time as
events.
Summing up, the phenomenology of motion perception has
been one of the richest sources of examples for high-level vision:
bistable organizations that undergo dramatic reorganization under
the inﬂuence of object knowledge, attention and instruction. There
is evidence of high-level motion codes that participate in the rec-
ognition of objects and the animation of perceived motion. Finally,
there is great promise for new research in causality and agency and
event perception. In other words, not much has happened yet, but
these areas are nevertheless at the center of high-level processes
and will clearly get more attention in the coming years.6. Conclusions
While there has been remarkable progress in high-level vision
over the past 25 years, it is perhaps worthwhile pointing out thatmany of the major questions were identiﬁed much earlier. They
certainly formed the core of Gestalt psychology (see Rock & Palmer,
1990). These phenomenological discoveries – subjective contours,
ambiguous ﬁgures, depth reversals, visual constancies – have ﬁlled
articles, textbooks, and classroom lectures on philosophy of mind
and perception for the last 100 years and in some cases much
more. What has changed over the past 25 years is the degree to
which implementations and algorithms have been developed to
explain these high-level effects. In particular, by the mid-1980s,
the pioneering work in computer vision (Barrow & Tenenbaum,
1981) and the cognitive revolution (Neisser, 1967) had ignited a
ground ﬁre of exciting advances and proposals. These peaked with
the publication of Marr’s book in 1982 and Irv Biederman’s Recog-
nition-by-components paper in 1987. Work on object structure,
executive function (memory and attention) and surface completion
have kept mid- and high-level vision active since then but the pace
has perhaps slowed between the mid 1990s and 2010. In its place,
driven by brain imaging work, many labs have focused on localiza-
tion of function and on the interactions of attention and awareness.
Attention itself attracts an ever increasing amount of research, trig-
gered by early work of Posner (1980) and Treisman (1988) and the
active attention contributions of Pylyshyn (1989) and others and
now the ever more detailed physiological work (Awh et al., 2006;
Treue, 2003). At some point, we will have to become a bit more
clear on what exactly is attention and then it is likely that mid-
and high-level vision approaches will more fully participate in
the vast enterprise of attention research.
So what is visual cognition? On the large scale, visual processes
construct a workable simulation of the visual world around us, one
that is updated in response to new visual data and which serves as
an efﬁcient problem space in which to answer questions. The rep-
resentation may be of the full scene or just focused on the question
at hand, computing information on an as-needed basis (O’Regan,
1992; Rensink, 2000). This representation is the basis for interac-
tion with the rest of the brain, exchanging descriptions of events,
responding to queries. How does it all work? Anderson’s work on
production systems (c.f. Anderson et al., 2004, 2008) is a good
example of a possible architecture for general cognitive processing.
This model has sets of ‘‘productions’’, each of them in an ‘‘if X, then
Y’’ format, where each production is equivalent to the routines
mentioned earlier. These respond to the conditions in input buffers
(short term memory or awareness or both) and add or change val-
ues in those buffers or in output buffers that direct motor re-
sponses. This production system architecture is Turing-machine
powerful and biologically plausible. Would visual processing have
its own version of a production system that constructs the repre-
sentation of the visual scene? Or is there a decentralized set of pro-
cesses, each an advanced inference engine on its own that posts
results to a speciﬁcally visual ‘‘blackboard’’ (van der Velde & de
Kamps, 2006) constructing, as a group, our overall experience of
the visual world? This community approach is currently the fa-
vored hypothesis for overall mental processes (Baars, 1988; Dehae-
ne & Naccache, 2001) and we might just scale it down for visual
processes, calling on multiple specialized routines (productions)
to work on different aspects of the image and perhaps different
locations. On the other hand, the very active research on visual
attention hints that there may be one central organization for vi-
sion at least for some purposes.
Clearly, the basic architecture for vision remains a central prize
for the next 25 years of vision research. More speciﬁcally, that is
the challenge if there is a true inferential architecture for vision.
The alternative is that high-level vision is executed as a vast ta-
ble-look up based on and interpolated from stored 2D views (e.g.
Bülthoff et al., 1995). Something like this is found for face recogni-
tion (see Ungerleider, 2011) where ﬁlters and the closest match in
a face space, perhaps biased by expectations, seem adequate to ex-
P. Cavanagh / Vision Research 51 (2011) 1538–1551 1549plain the recognition of individuals (Freiwald, Tsao, & Livingstone,
2009; Quiroga, Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2008). In other words, as
one intrepid reviewer of this paper pointed out, low-level vision
approaches may eventually subsume all the functions of visual
cognition, for lunch. The game is afoot.
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